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Abstract:	  Most	  transnational	  regulatory	  problems	  involve	  technical	  systems:	  extended	  sets	  of	  productive	  connections	  between	  humans,	  organized	  knowledge,	  and	  material	  objects.	  The	  functioning	  and	  relations	  between	  transnational	  business	  governance	  (TBG)	  schemes	  in	  any	  particular	  issue	  area	  are	  usually	  shaped	  by	  these	  technical	  systems.	  These	  technical	  systems	  and	  the	  material	  world	  that	  they	  interact	  with	  are	  not	  simply	  exogenous	  environments	  for	  TBG	  schemes.	  Individual	  TBG	  schemes	  can	  enhance	  their	  power	  and	  influence	  by	  expanding	  their	  function	  in	  a	  technical	  system,	  by	  incorporating	  the	  material	  aspects	  of	  the	  system	  into	  their	  activities,	  or	  by	  producing	  the	  system’s	  technical	  knowledge.	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  where	  a	  robust	  technical	  system	  exists,	  the	  degree	  of	  integration	  and	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  of	  the	  activities	  it	  involves	  will	  mean	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  that	  technical	  system	  will	  be	  coordinated	  overall	  by	  only	  one	  TBG	  scheme.	  There	  are	  two	  exceptions:	  where	  technical	  systems	  overlap;	  or	  where	  the	  system	  is	  so	  weak	  that	  competitive	  pressures	  outweigh	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  specialization.	  The	  article	  develops	  these	  themes	  by	  drawing	  on	  theories	  that	  have	  focused	  on	  the	  social	  and	  political	  aspects	  of	  technical	  systems.	  The	  article	  identifies	  the	  contributions	  and	  limits	  of	  these	  theories	  and	  of	  a	  focus	  on	  technical	  systems	  in	  analyzing	  interactions	  among	  TBG	  schemes.	  The	  relevance	  of	  the	  theoretical	  points	  is	  assessed	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  TBG	  schemes	  that	  are	  active	  in	  global	  finance.  
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Introduction	  There	  is	  a	  pressing	  need	  to	  understand	  better	  the	  relationships	  among	  the	  proliferating	  and	  increasingly	  complex	  sets	  of	  transnational	  business	  governance	  (TBG)	  schemes	  that	  are	  evident	  across	  a	  variety	  of	  industries	  and	  issue	  areas.	  The	  editors	  of	  this	  issue	  (Eberlein	  et	  al,	  this	  issue)	  define	  TBG	  as	  “systematically	  involving	  a	  significant	  degree	  of	  non-­‐state	  authority	  in	  rule-­‐making,	  implementation,	  or	  enforcement	  across	  national	  borders.”	  TBG	  can	  involve	  a	  complex	  mix	  of	  public	  and	  private	  actors	  and	  institutions,	  with	  various	  governance	  functions	  distributed	  across	  them.	  Consistent	  with	  its	  dictionary	  definition,	  “scheme”	  can	  refer	  to	  “a	  systematic	  or	  organized	  configuration”,	  which	  does	  not	  necessarily	  imply	  strategic	  intention,	  or	  “a	  plan	  or	  program	  of	  action;	  especially;	  a	  crafty	  or	  secret	  one”	  which	  does	  (Merriam-­‐Webster	  2012).	  Patterns	  of	  interaction	  among	  the	  actors	  and	  institutions	  involved	  are	  significant	  for	  understanding	  the	  overall	  behavior	  and	  effects	  of	  a	  TBG	  scheme.	  There	  are	  important	  public	  policy	  reasons	  to	  better	  understand	  TBG	  schemes.	  Today,	  most	  significant	  transnational	  governance	  initiatives	  incorporate	  private	  actors	  in	  some	  way.	  A	  great	  many	  such	  initiatives	  also	  involve	  the	  interaction	  of	  multiple	  and	  disparate	  governance	  mechanisms	  rather	  than	  a	  fully	  integrated	  project	  with	  clear	  boundaries.	  For	  example,	  as	  discussed	  further	  below,	  the	  governance	  of	  financial	  derivatives	  markets	  involves	  interactions	  between	  the	  rules	  managed	  by	  the	  private	  International	  Swaps	  and	  Derivatives	  Association,	  the	  organizational	  capacities	  of	  particular	  banks,	  local	  legal	  systems,	  and	  public	  authorities	  organized	  in	  various	  transnational	  groupings,	  including	  the	  G20	  and	  the	  OTC	  Derivatives	  Regulators’	  Forum.	  These	  interactions	  and	  the	  governance	  they	  provide	  constitute	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  for	  derivatives.	  There	  are	  a	  great	  many	  public	  policy	  problems	  that	  require	  this	  type	  of	  complex	  coordination,	  but	  we	  need	  to	  understand	  better	  the	  factors	  that	  shape	  different	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  the	  interactions	  among	  them.	  This	  article	  focuses	  especially	  on	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  technical	  systems	  can	  shape	  TBG	  schemes.	  A	  technical	  system	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  set	  of	  relationships	  among	  humans	  and	  non-­‐human	  objects	  that	  are	  shaped	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  operations	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  required	  to	  successfully	  achieve	  a	  purpose	  or	  output	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  that	  system.1	  An	  example	  is	  an	  electrical	  grid,	  where	  coordination	  of	  the	  voltage	  is	  crucial	  to	  all	  aspects	  of	  the	  system,	  from	  the	  hydro-­‐electric	  dam	  to	  the	  desk	  lamp.	  Today	  very	  large	  technical	  systems	  are	  increasingly	  common,	  and	  many,	  such	  as	  train	  systems,	  the	  airline	  industry	  or	  financial	  trading	  systems,	  cross	  borders.	  However,	  smaller	  and	  less	  clearly	  defined	  technical	  systems,	  such	  as	  a	  set	  of	  best	  practices	  that	  are	  central	  to	  the	  functioning	  of	  an	  industry	  segment,	  can	  also	  play	  a	  role	  in	  structuring	  TBG	  schemes.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  technical	  systems	  differs	  from	  approaches	  which	  start	  from	  the	  strategies	  and	  interactions	  of	  key	  actors	  in	  different	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  to	  try	  to	  see	  why	  these	  might	  involve	  competition	  at	  some	  times,	  and	  collaboration	  at	  others.	  Outcomes	  
1 For foundational work in the study of large scale technical systems see Hughes (1983), Mayntz and Hughes 
(1988). See also Perez (1986), Callon (1991).   
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  might	  be	  predicted	  by	  the	  relative	  capabilities	  of	  the	  actors.	  Another	  approach	  is	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  predominantly	  private	  TBG	  schemes	  with	  more	  purely	  public	  actors,	  and	  to	  treat	  these	  as	  part	  of	  a	  co-­‐regulatory	  process.	  In	  contrast,	  an	  emphasis	  on	  technical	  systems	  draws	  our	  attention	  to	  the	  relationship	  between	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  activities	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  govern.	  From	  this	  perspective	  TBG	  schemes	  are	  governance	  nodes	  that	  arise	  from	  a	  relatively	  dense	  set	  of	  inter-­‐related	  humans,	  objects,	  and	  practices,	  organized	  around	  certain	  shared	  purposes	  that	  may	  precede	  the	  emergence	  of	  any	  recognizable	  TBG	  scheme.	  	  I	  hypothesize	  that	  where	  a	  robust	  technical	  system	  exists,	  the	  degree	  of	  integration	  and	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  of	  the	  activities	  it	  involves	  will	  mean	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  that	  technical	  system	  will	  be	  coordinated	  overall	  by	  only	  one	  TBG	  scheme,	  but	  with	  two	  exceptions:	  where	  previously	  independent	  technical	  systems	  begin	  to	  overlap	  or	  where	  the	  system	  is	  so	  weak	  that	  competitive	  pressures	  outweigh	  the	  factors	  contributing	  to	  the	  tendency	  for	  a	  technical	  system	  to	  have	  only	  one	  TBG	  scheme.	  Together	  these	  conjectures	  help	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  technical	  systems	  on	  TBG	  schemes.	  This	  emphasis	  on	  the	  interaction	  between	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  technical	  systems	  is	  not	  intended	  to	  suggest	  that	  strategic	  actors	  not	  relevant.	  Instead,	  the	  purpose	  is	  to	  bring	  into	  clearer	  view	  a	  set	  of	  very	  important	  industry-­‐level	  factors	  that	  can	  be	  missed	  if	  analysis	  focuses	  too	  narrowly	  on	  the	  interactions	  among	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  states.	  Without	  considering	  the	  significance	  of	  technical	  systems	  it	  will	  be	  difficult	  to	  be	  effective	  in	  the	  design	  or	  analysis	  of	  TBG	  schemes.	  Some	  of	  these	  industry-­‐level	  factors	  are	  mentioned	  in	  the	  other	  articles	  in	  this	  special	  issue,	  especially	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  supply	  chain	  in	  the	  forestry	  cases	  (Cashore	  and	  Stone;	  Overdevest	  and	  Zeitlin,	  both	  this	  issue),	  and	  the	  difference	  in	  production	  processes	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  product	  in	  the	  diamond,	  mining,	  and	  conflict	  mineral	  cases	  analyzed	  by	  Haufler	  (this	  issue).	  However	  in	  this	  article	  I	  focus	  more	  directly	  and	  systematically	  on	  these	  industry-­‐level	  factors.	  	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  article	  conceptualizes	  technical	  systems	  and	  their	  relationships	  to	  TBG	  schemes.	  In	  the	  second	  part	  of	  this	  article	  I	  examine	  the	  case	  of	  global	  finance.	  Global	  finance	  overall	  is	  more	  technically	  complex	  and	  interdependent	  than	  many	  industries,	  including	  at	  least	  some	  aspects	  of	  the	  resource-­‐based	  industries	  that	  are	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  other	  articles.	  This	  case	  is	  therefore	  particularly	  well	  suited	  to	  exploring	  the	  significance	  of	  technical	  systems	  for	  TBG	  schemes.	  	  
Technical	  systems	  and	  TBG	  schemes:	  conceptual	  issues	  Intuitively	  it	  seems	  plausible	  that	  complex	  integrated	  technical	  systems	  such	  as	  nuclear	  reactors,	  aircraft	  carriers,	  a	  rail	  network,	  or	  an	  electrical	  grid	  require	  some	  degree	  of	  centralized	  coordination.	  If	  pilots	  competed	  with	  each	  other	  for	  when	  and	  how	  to	  land	  on	  an	  aircraft	  carrier,	  disaster	  would	  soon	  ensue.	  This	  is	  quite	  different	  than	  the	  type	  of	  decentralized	  coordination	  that	  is	  sufficient	  for	  pedestrians	  to	  avoid	  bumping	  into	  one	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  another	  on	  a	  sidewalk.	  In	  these	  examples,	  the	  need	  for	  centralized	  coordination	  seems	  clearly	  linked	  to	  the	  technical	  properties	  of	  the	  objects	  and	  systems	  involved.	  The	  complexity,	  integration	  and	  precision	  of	  controls	  needed	  to	  land	  a	  plane	  on	  a	  carrier	  and	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  failure	  of	  those	  control	  systems	  are	  far	  greater	  than	  for	  a	  pedestrian	  on	  a	  sidewalk.	  	  	   	  	  	   Despite	  its	  intuitive	  plausibility,	  the	  relationship	  between	  governance	  and	  technical	  systems	  has	  often	  not	  been	  considered	  seriously	  enough.	  For	  much	  of	  the	  past	  half	  century	  states	  and	  firms	  were	  conceptualized	  as	  atomized	  competitors,	  governed	  by	  the	  constraints	  of	  that	  competition.	  While	  technologies	  such	  as	  weapons	  systems	  or	  industrial	  innovations	  were	  considered,	  they	  were	  mostly	  treated	  as	  either	  exogenous	  to	  the	  relationships	  that	  really	  mattered,	  or	  as	  sufficiently	  controlled	  by	  atomized	  actors	  that	  they	  did	  not	  play	  any	  significant	  independent	  role	  analytically.	  	  	   	  	  	   Today	  there	  is	  increasingly	  widespread	  recognition	  that	  these	  competitive	  actors	  are	  embedded	  in	  and	  operating	  through	  a	  complex	  and	  dense	  set	  of	  formal	  and	  informal	  institutions	  that	  shape	  their	  interaction	  to	  an	  important	  degree.	  In	  the	  study	  of	  states	  this	  has	  been	  evident	  in	  a	  shift	  from	  simple	  realist	  models	  to	  complex	  conceptions	  of	  global	  governance	  (eg.	  Djelic	  and	  Sahlin-­‐Andersson	  2007).	  In	  the	  study	  of	  firms	  this	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  shift	  from	  models	  of	  perfect	  competition	  to	  topics	  such	  as	  value	  chains	  (Dicken	  et	  al	  2001),	  national	  business	  systems	  (Whitley	  2007),	  and	  larger	  sub-­‐disciplines	  such	  as	  institutional	  economics,	  and	  law	  and	  economics.	  These	  shifts	  provide	  an	  opportunity	  to	  consider	  more	  carefully	  the	  independent	  impact	  of	  the	  technical	  systems	  that	  are	  also	  part	  of	  the	  environment	  of	  state	  and	  market	  actors	  and	  that	  may	  shape	  the	  governance	  arrangements	  that	  they	  develop.	  	  	  
Insights	  from	  existing	  literatures	  	  	  	   The	  notion	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  has	  been	  most	  clearly	  developed	  in	  a	  literature	  that	  was	  inspired	  by	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  by	  Hughes	  (1983)	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  generation	  and	  transmission	  systems	  for	  electricity	  (Dosi	  et	  al.,	  1992;	  Foray	  and	  Freeman,	  1993;	  Cantwell,	  1989;	  Mayntz	  and	  Hughes,	  1988).	  This	  literature	  has	  emphasized	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  these	  technical	  systems	  needed	  to	  address	  a	  series	  of	  interrelated	  technical,	  social	  and	  political	  problems	  before	  they	  could	  emerge.	  Once	  a	  technical	  system	  is	  established	  it	  can	  have	  a	  self-­‐reinforcing	  momentum	  that	  extends	  not	  only	  to	  the	  objects	  involved,	  but	  to	  the	  humans	  who	  are	  organized	  around	  its	  functioning.	  A	  technical	  system	  involves	  a	  complex	  mixture	  of	  ideas	  and	  materiality.	  Cantwell	  (1989)	  and	  others	  (eg.	  Dosi	  and	  Orsenigo	  1988:16)	  have	  referred	  to	  “technological	  paradigms”	  which	  include	  expertise,	  definitions	  of	  problems	  to	  be	  solved,	  ways	  of	  solving	  them,	  and	  the	  types	  of	  technical	  artefacts	  that	  should	  be	  developed	  and	  used.	  	  	   	  	  	   It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  should	  not	  imply	  the	  types	  of	  functionalism	  or	  technological	  determinism	  that	  have	  been	  severely	  and	  appropriately	  criticized	  for	  underestimating	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  human	  agency	  and	  politics.	  The	  constraints	  on	  a	  technical	  system	  do	  not	  arise	  from	  some	  deep	  systemic	  functional	  imperative	  beyond	  the	  reach	  of	  humans,	  but	  instead	  from	  a	  creative	  collective	  engagement	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  of	  groups	  of	  humans	  and	  objects	  which	  produces	  shared	  understandings	  of	  the	  goals,	  tasks	  and	  tools	  involved	  in	  addressing	  particular	  types	  of	  problems.	  However	  even	  if	  the	  technical	  system	  is	  socially	  constructed,	  for	  the	  participants	  in	  the	  technical	  system	  it	  often	  appears	  that	  they	  must	  work	  with	  and	  through	  the	  existing	  technical	  system.	  	  	   	  	  	   Technical	  systems	  can	  also	  involve	  a	  non-­‐functional	  exercise	  of	  power,	  for	  instance	  when	  a	  firm	  makes	  use	  of	  a	  privileged	  position	  in	  such	  a	  system	  to	  reproduce	  its	  power	  and	  exclude	  others,	  or	  when	  actors	  seek	  to	  reinforce	  their	  power	  by	  recruiting	  objects	  to	  extend	  it.	  Actor-­‐network	  theory	  is	  particularly	  useful	  in	  analyzing	  the	  interaction	  of	  humans,	  objects,	  and	  power	  in	  ways	  that	  provide	  insights	  into	  technical	  systems.2	  A	  well-­‐known	  example	  is	  Latour’s	  (2009)	  analysis	  of	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  governance	  role	  of	  a	  police	  officer	  directing	  traffic	  and	  a	  speed	  bump.	  In	  technical	  systems,	  objects	  and	  non-­‐humans	  can	  reinforce	  the	  actions	  and	  power	  of	  humans,	  such	  as	  with	  rulebooks,	  but	  also	  defeat	  them,	  such	  as	  with	  unexpected	  viruses.	  	   	  	  	   Taken	  together	  these	  literatures	  are	  useful	  in	  developing	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  and	  in	  beginning	  to	  see	  how	  this	  concept	  is	  relevant	  to	  TBG	  schemes.	  A	  technical	  system	  involves	  a	  set	  of	  interdependent	  relationships	  among	  actors	  and	  objects,	  engaged	  in	  a	  common	  enterprise	  that	  is	  seen	  as	  involving	  certain	  functional	  constraints,	  but	  that	  is	  also	  shaped	  by	  relations	  of	  power	  and	  conflict.	  Where	  the	  technical	  system	  operates,	  as	  most	  do	  today,	  within	  a	  networked	  horizontal	  environment	  where	  eliciting	  collaboration	  is	  more	  effective	  than	  issuing	  hierarchical	  commands,	  actors	  need	  to	  consider	  the	  opportunities	  and	  barriers	  that	  the	  technical	  system	  offers	  if	  they	  wish	  to	  be	  successful.	  For	  instance	  a	  music	  producer	  today	  that	  only	  issued	  products	  on	  cassette	  tapes	  would	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  succeed	  than	  one	  that	  had	  considered	  distributing	  the	  product	  electronically	  using	  digital	  rights	  management.	  This	  need	  to	  interact	  with	  existing	  technical	  systems	  applies	  to	  TBG	  schemes	  as	  well.	  	  	  
The	  relationship	  between	  technical	  systems	  and	  TBG	  schemes	  	  	  	   Older	  models	  of	  command	  and	  control	  business	  regulation	  typically	  would	  place	  the	  regulator	  in	  the	  state	  with	  its	  supreme	  authority,	  issuing	  mandatory	  rules	  to	  govern	  less	  powerful	  business	  actors,	  including	  those	  connected	  to	  one	  another	  in	  technical	  systems.	  TBG	  schemes,	  in	  contrast,	  involve	  non-­‐state	  authority	  to	  a	  significant	  degree,	  and	  the	  previous	  boundary	  between	  regulators	  and	  firms	  becomes	  blurry.	  Public	  authorities	  may	  implement	  policies	  through	  TBG	  schemes,	  but	  the	  reverse	  is	  possible	  as	  well,	  such	  as	  when	  an	  industry	  successfully	  gets	  rules	  formulated	  by	  a	  TBG	  scheme	  implemented	  by	  government.	  	  	   	  	  	   This	  shift	  from	  command	  and	  control	  business	  regulation	  is	  part	  of	  a	  larger	  shift	  in	  governance	  towards	  more	  horizontal	  networked	  arrangements	  where	  goals	  are	  achieved	  by	  enrolling	  (Callon,	  1986;	  Braithwaite	  and	  Drahos	  2000)	  or	  orchestrating	  (Abbott	  and	  
                                                
2 On ANT see for instance Law and Hetherington (2000). More generally see Biagoli (1999). 
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  Snidal	  2009a)	  a	  variety	  of	  relatively	  autonomous	  sets	  of	  organized	  activities.	  Complexity,	  globalization,	  social	  acceleration,	  information	  technologies,	  and	  growth	  in	  education	  levels	  have	  all	  been	  identified	  as	  factors	  contributing	  to	  this	  shift.	  TBG	  schemes	  have	  some	  autonomy	  from	  public	  authorities,	  but	  at	  the	  same	  time	  the	  activities	  that	  TBG	  schemes	  seek	  to	  govern	  also	  involve	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  other	  relatively	  autonomous	  governance	  mechanisms	  that	  must	  be	  aligned	  with	  the	  TBG	  scheme’s	  goals	  if	  the	  TBG	  is	  to	  be	  successful.	  These	  other	  governance	  mechanisms	  could	  include,	  for	  example,	  recognized	  best	  business	  practices	  or	  technical	  artefacts,	  such	  as	  voltage	  regulators	  in	  an	  electrical	  network.	  In	  other	  words,	  a	  TBG	  scheme	  is	  not	  primarily	  a	  stand-­‐alone	  rule-­‐making	  authority	  but	  instead	  is	  a	  node	  in	  a	  set	  of	  linkages	  among	  relatively	  autonomously	  governed	  activities	  that	  run	  from	  the	  micro-­‐level	  activities	  in	  the	  industry	  through	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  to	  the	  public	  authorities	  that	  seek	  to	  regulate	  that	  industry,	  with	  relations	  of	  influence	  moving	  in	  both	  directions.	  	  	   	  	  	   There	  is	  an	  important	  relationship	  between	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  “industry”.	  Industries	  have	  certain	  well-­‐recognized	  shared	  ways	  of	  doing	  things,	  and	  they	  usually	  have	  a	  degree	  of	  interdependence,	  such	  as	  a	  common	  reliance	  on	  a	  supply	  of	  a	  particular	  production	  input,	  expertise,	  legal	  environment,	  reputation,	  or	  market.	  Although	  we	  typically	  think	  of	  industries	  as	  quasi-­‐natural	  categories,	  they,	  like	  technical	  systems,	  are	  constructed,	  and	  their	  boundaries	  or	  defining	  properties	  can	  change.	  Industry	  associations	  help	  organize	  and	  define	  the	  industry,	  and	  address	  its	  common	  problems.	  Typically	  an	  industry	  that	  reaches	  a	  certain	  threshold	  of	  definition	  and	  recognition	  will	  have	  a	  single	  industry	  association	  for	  the	  same	  reasons	  that	  were	  offered	  above	  for	  a	  technical	  system	  having	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme.	  Often	  a	  TBG	  scheme	  will	  rely	  upon	  an	  industry	  association	  to	  initiate,	  provide	  or	  support	  it.	  	  	  	   	  	  	   Despite	  these	  overlaps	  and	  similarities	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  have	  a	  distinctive	  concept	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  rather	  than	  just	  relying	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  an	  industry.	  A	  technical	  system	  refers	  more	  directly	  and	  explicitly	  to	  the	  ties	  that	  constitute	  its	  integration,	  allowing	  us	  to	  more	  easily	  assess	  variations	  in	  this	  type	  of	  integration	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  coincide	  with	  the	  boundaries	  of	  an	  industry.	  The	  complexity	  and	  practical	  challenges	  associated	  with	  technical	  systems	  are	  also	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  the	  types	  of	  private	  rulemaking	  that	  TBG	  schemes	  exhibit,	  whereas	  the	  simpler	  types	  of	  shared	  interests	  that	  are	  often	  associated	  with	  an	  industry	  may	  only	  lead	  to	  more	  minimal	  outputs	  of	  an	  industry	  association,	  such	  as	  pressuring	  governments	  for	  rule	  changes,	  or	  joint	  promotional	  campaigns	  extolling	  the	  industry’s	  virtues.	  There	  is	  a	  rich	  and	  useful	  literature	  on	  industry	  associations	  and	  the	  roles	  that	  they	  play	  in	  governance	  (eg.	  Streeck	  and	  Schmitter	  1985).	  These	  associations	  often	  act	  as	  or	  contribute	  to	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  their	  industries.	  	  	   	  	  	   An	  industry	  that	  has	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  highly	  integrated	  technical	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  very	  different	  relationship	  to	  a	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  seeks	  to	  govern	  it	  than	  would	  a	  fragmented	  industry	  that	  consists	  of	  a	  large	  number	  of	  firms	  that	  have	  little	  connection	  with	  one	  another.	  Both	  the	  capacity	  for	  governance	  and	  the	  need	  for	  centralized	  coordination	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  greater	  in	  more	  tightly	  integrated	  technical	  systems,	  leading	  to	  a	  closer	  and	  more	  interdependent	  relationship	  between	  such	  a	  system	  and	  any	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  seeks	  to	  govern	  it.	  A	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  seeks	  to	  govern	  an	  industry	  that	  is	  organized	  to	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  a	  significant	  degree	  by	  a	  technical	  system	  will	  have	  to	  draw	  on	  the	  organizational	  properties	  of	  that	  technical	  system	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  successful.	  	   	  	  	   My	  emphasis	  so	  far	  has	  been	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  organization	  of	  an	  industry	  by	  a	  technical	  system	  and	  a	  TBG	  scheme,	  but	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  as	  well	  the	  role	  of	  public	  authorities.	  Public	  authorities	  have	  extraordinary	  powers	  that	  can	  break	  up	  and	  reorganize	  technical	  systems,	  such	  as	  when	  the	  US	  government	  broke	  up	  AT&T’s	  monopoly	  of	  the	  US	  telephone	  system,	  or	  when	  US	  and	  European	  competition	  rules	  constrained	  Microsoft’s	  efforts	  to	  encode	  Explorer’s	  dominance	  in	  its	  software.	  However	  these	  types	  of	  government	  actions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  rare	  since,	  in	  general,	  public	  authorities	  value	  the	  outputs	  of	  technical	  systems	  and	  do	  not	  wish	  to	  disrupt	  them.	  	  	   	  	  	   A	  TBG	  scheme	  provides	  a	  useful	  intermediary	  between	  an	  industry	  and	  public	  authorities.	  In	  some	  cases	  the	  technical	  system	  may	  be	  closely	  integrated	  with	  the	  industry	  but	  relatively	  detached	  from	  the	  public	  authorities.	  In	  other	  cases	  the	  public	  authorities	  may	  be	  more	  directly	  integrated	  with	  the	  technical	  system.	  For	  the	  industry,	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  can	  more	  effectively	  promote	  the	  technical	  system’s	  interests	  with	  public	  authorities.	  Public	  authorities	  may	  also	  find	  it	  more	  efficient	  to	  engage	  with	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  and	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  they	  can	  encourage	  this,	  such	  as	  providing	  privileged	  access,	  legal	  authority,	  or	  funding	  to	  a	  chosen	  TBG	  scheme.	  However	  if	  a	  technical	  system	  is	  absent	  or	  weak	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  weak	  as	  well,	  either	  lacking	  significant	  content,	  or	  being	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  public	  authorities.	  Where	  a	  technical	  system	  is	  robust,	  it	  is	  unlikely	  that	  public	  authorities	  would	  impose	  competing	  TBG	  schemes	  on	  it.	  Accordingly,	  technical	  systems	  are	  important	  analytically	  even	  where	  public	  authorities	  are	  taking	  strong	  initiatives	  in	  the	  development	  of	  TBG	  schemes.	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  above	  points	  lead	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  set	  out	  in	  the	  introduction	  to	  this	  article:	  where	  a	  highly	  integrated	  technical	  system	  exists,	  we	  may	  expect	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  to	  provide	  overall	  governance	  for	  that	  technical	  system	  rather	  than	  multiple	  TBG	  schemes	  that	  compete	  to	  provide	  governance	  services.	  This	  is	  because	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  technical	  system	  requires	  a	  degree	  of	  coordinated	  governance,	  and	  this	  is	  usually	  likely	  to	  outweigh	  any	  efficiency	  benefits	  of	  competing	  governance	  providers.	  Moreover,	  the	  integration	  of	  a	  governance	  node	  with	  a	  technical	  system	  makes	  it	  difficult	  for	  competing	  governance	  providers	  to	  establish	  a	  foothold	  in	  the	  technical	  system.	  This	  logic	  can	  be	  partially	  captured	  by	  more	  rational-­‐choice	  oriented	  concepts	  such	  as	  economies	  of	  scale	  or	  network	  effects,	  both	  of	  which	  can	  offer	  an	  explanation	  for	  why	  it	  might	  be	  more	  efficient	  to	  bring	  governance	  functions	  together	  in	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme.	  However	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  explains	  why	  economies	  of	  scale	  and	  network	  effects	  may	  be	  present	  in	  some	  industries	  and	  not	  others,	  and	  helps	  illuminate	  in	  more	  detail	  the	  specific	  relationships	  that	  tie	  a	  TBG	  scheme	  to	  the	  industry	  it	  seeks	  to	  govern.	  	  	   	  	  	   It	  should	  be	  emphasized	  that	  this	  hypothesis	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  TBG	  scheme	  associated	  with	  each	  highly	  integrated	  technical	  system,	  but	  rather	  that	  only	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  one	  TBG	  scheme	  will	  provide	  overall	  governance	  for	  the	  system.	  A	  large	  technical	  system	  is	  likely	  to	  include	  many	  smaller	  subsystems	  and	  if	  these	  are	  tightly	  integrated	  they	  too	  may	  each	  have	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme.	  However	  these	  sub-­‐system	  TBG	  schemes	  are	  not	  likely	  to	  compete	  with	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  provides	  overall	  governance	  for	  the	  larger	  technical	  system.	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   Not	  all	  industries	  have	  highly	  integrated	  technical	  systems,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  exceptions	  to	  the	  above	  hypothesized	  relationship.	  Technical	  systems	  are	  not	  stand-­‐alone	  machines	  interacting	  with	  external	  environments,	  but	  rather	  zones	  of	  interconnectedness	  within	  larger	  networks	  of	  interaction.	  The	  tightness	  of	  this	  interconnectedness	  can	  vary.	  Perrow	  (2004)	  has	  distinguished	  between	  “tightly	  coupled”	  and	  “loosely	  coupled”	  technical	  systems.	  The	  former	  are	  more	  time-­‐dependent,	  permit	  less	  variation	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  required	  steps,	  have	  little	  slack,	  and	  are	  prone	  to	  what	  Perrow	  has	  called	  “normal	  accidents”,	  such	  as	  a	  meltdown	  in	  a	  nuclear	  plant.	  However	  there	  are	  also	  other	  variations	  in	  interconnectedness	  that	  can	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  competitiveness	  of	  TBG	  schemes.	  Two	  exceptions	  to	  the	  above	  hypothesis	  are	  especially	  important	  in	  explaining	  the	  presence	  of	  competing	  TBG	  schemes.	  	  	   	  	  	   First,	  two	  technical	  systems	  that	  previously	  were	  relatively	  independent	  of	  one	  another	  can	  begin	  to	  overlap	  in	  their	  operations,	  leading	  to	  competition	  between	  their	  TBG	  schemes.	  This	  change	  could	  primarily	  be	  geographic,	  when	  two	  technical	  systems	  operating	  independently	  in	  different	  regions	  expand	  into	  each	  other’s	  territory.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  functional,	  such	  as	  when	  technical	  systems	  cross	  industry	  boundaries	  in	  new	  ways.	  The	  growing	  overlap	  between	  the	  electronics	  and	  automobile	  industries	  is	  an	  example.	  The	  technical	  systems	  may	  merge,	  in	  which	  case	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  will	  arise,	  but	  if	  they	  retain	  some	  independence	  then	  they	  may	  each	  have	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  competes	  with	  the	  other.	  This	  may	  involve	  political	  conflict.	  	  	   	  	  	   Second,	  where	  the	  technical	  constraints	  in	  a	  technical	  system	  are	  seen	  as	  quite	  weak	  the	  advantages	  of	  having	  competing	  governance	  providers	  may	  outweigh	  the	  advantages	  of	  having	  a	  single	  coordinating	  TBG	  scheme.	  This	  is	  likely	  to	  occur	  when	  the	  industry	  is	  closer	  to	  a	  structure	  that	  is	  characteristic	  of	  atomistic	  competitive	  markets	  than	  to	  an	  integrated	  technical	  system.	  	  	   	  	  	   How	  can	  we	  identify	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  in	  a	  way	  that	  ensures	  that	  this	  identification	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  number	  of	  TBG	  schemes	  involved?	  Without	  answering	  this	  question	  there	  is	  a	  risk	  that	  the	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  tautological,	  unfalsifiable,	  and	  meaningless—that	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  single	  influential	  TBG	  scheme	  will	  be	  taken	  as	  evidence	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  technical	  system.	  	   	  	  	   There	  are	  two	  key	  empirical	  criteria	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  technical	  system,	  one	  more	  ideational,	  and	  the	  other	  more	  material.	  First,	  the	  actors	  involved	  identify	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  common	  enterprise,	  such	  as	  an	  industry,	  a	  production	  process,	  or	  a	  network,	  that	  has	  a	  purpose.	  “Enterprise”	  here	  implies	  that	  there	  is	  a	  common	  product	  or	  outcome	  that	  defines	  this	  identification.	  Second,	  the	  linkage	  of	  these	  actors	  to	  the	  enterprise’s	  goal	  is	  seen	  as	  constraining	  the	  actors.	  These	  constraints	  may	  have	  an	  easily	  identifiable	  material	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  character,	  such	  as	  joint	  reliance	  on	  a	  shared	  physical	  infrastructure,	  source	  of	  inputs,	  distribution	  mechanism,	  or	  some	  other	  function,	  or	  collective	  sequential	  transformation	  of	  a	  particular	  object.	  However	  the	  constraints	  may	  take	  a	  less	  self-­‐evidently	  material	  form,	  such	  as	  when	  a	  recognized	  set	  of	  formalized	  practices	  are	  seen	  as	  required	  if	  the	  goals	  of	  the	  enterprise	  are	  to	  be	  attained.	  These	  practices,	  which	  may	  be	  especially	  important	  in	  service	  economies,	  may	  seem	  ideational	  rather	  than	  material,	  but	  they	  will	  always	  have	  a	  material	  aspect,	  such	  as	  the	  inscription	  of	  rules	  and	  forms	  on	  paper	  or	  electronic	  media,	  or	  the	  physicality	  of	  particular	  humans	  in	  particular	  offices.	  In	  all	  cases	  the	  participants	  in	  a	  technical	  system	  are	  linked	  by	  more	  than	  a	  set	  of	  shared	  ideas,	  and	  the	  system	  has	  a	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  so	  that	  it	  cannot	  be	  changed	  by	  thinking	  alone	  or	  by	  the	  disaggregated	  initiatives	  of	  individual	  actors.	  	  	  
 
TBG	  schemes	  and	  technical	  systems	  in	  global	  finance	  
 	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  examine	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  global	  finance.	  The	  emphasis	  is	  on	  the	  governance	  of	  private	  financial	  markets	  rather	  than	  official	  development	  assistance	  or	  monetary	  policy	  since	  these	  latter	  aspects	  of	  finance	  mainly	  involve	  the	  financial	  and	  monetary	  practices	  of	  states	  rather	  than	  the	  regulation	  of	  business.	  There	  are	  a	  great	  many	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  global	  finance.	  For	  an	  overview	  of	  many	  of	  these	  schemes	  and	  the	  private	  transnational	  associations	  linked	  to	  them	  see	  McKeen-­‐Edwards	  and	  Porter	  (forthcoming).	  	  This	  book	  was	  based	  on	  an	  examination	  of	  225	  such	  associations.	  The	  present	  paper	  draws	  on	  that	  research.3	  The	  complexity	  and	  variation	  across	  TBG	  schemes	  and	  associations	  preclude	  quantitative	  analysis,	  and	  a	  comprehensive	  qualitative	  survey	  goes	  well	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  present	  article.	  However,	  the	  relevance	  of	  technical	  systems	  to	  TBG	  schemes	  can	  be	  illustrated	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  a	  more	  selected	  set	  of	  financial	  TBGs.	  	   	  	  	  	   I	  start	  with	  the	  largest	  and	  most	  important	  categories	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activities,	  some	  of	  which,	  such	  as	  banking,	  securities,	  and	  insurance,	  are	  usually	  considered	  to	  be	  industries	  themselves.	  In	  each	  case	  private	  authority	  is	  most	  evident	  in	  the	  central	  role	  played	  by	  a	  transnational	  financial	  association.	  The	  following	  sections	  relate	  these	  expressions	  of	  private	  authority	  to	  TBG	  and	  technical	  systems	  in	  these	  major	  categories	  of	  activities.	  It	  will	  become	  apparent	  that	  these	  technical	  systems,	  even	  though	  they	  are	  not	  tightly	  integrated,	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  I	  then	  turn	  to	  other	  types	  of	  TBG	  schemes,	  including	  smaller	  ones	  displaying	  more	  variation	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  integration	  and	  competition.	  	  
Private	  authority,	  associations,	  and	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  the	  major	  categories	  of	  transnational	  
financial	  activity	  	  	  
                                                
3 The associations were identified using the Yearbook of International Organizations and internet searches. 
Information on the associations discussed in this section can be found on their websites, which can be located using 
Google, as well as in the references noted.  
11                          TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS GOVERNANCE INTERACTIONS	  	  	   As	  discussed	  above,	  there	  is	  a	  relationship	  between	  technical	  systems	  and	  industries	  because	  both	  of	  these	  involve,	  and	  are	  defined	  by,	  a	  set	  of	  distinctive	  interdependent	  practices	  that	  may	  overlap	  or	  coincide,	  and	  because	  industry	  associations	  often	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  TBG	  schemes.	  A	  striking	  feature	  of	  the	  associational	  landscape	  in	  global	  finance	  is	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  major	  types	  of	  financial	  activity	  have	  a	  unique	  transnational	  financial	  association	  that	  claims	  to	  represent	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  business	  actors	  involved	  in	  it.	  These	  associations	  are	  the	  primary	  vehicle	  through	  which	  private	  authority	  is	  constituted	  and	  integrated	  with	  TBG	  schemes	  for	  that	  category	  of	  activity.	  Key	  examples	  of	  associations	  and	  the	  category	  of	  activity	  they	  uniquely	  represent	  include	  the	  Institute	  of	  International	  Finance	  for	  banking,	  the	  Global	  Financial	  Market	  Association	  (GFMA)	  for	  securities,	  the	  International	  Swaps	  and	  Derivatives	  Association	  (ISDA)	  for	  derivatives,	  the	  World	  Federation	  of	  Exchanges	  (WFE)	  for	  organized	  financial	  exchanges,	  and	  the	  Alternative	  Investment	  Management	  Association	  (AIMA)	  for	  hedge	  funds.	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  governance	  roles	  of	  these	  associations	  are	  quite	  varied.	  In	  all	  cases	  they	  involve	  a	  mix	  of	  involvement	  with	  governance	  mechanisms	  that	  are	  primarily	  controlled	  by	  public	  authorities,	  and	  governance	  mechanisms	  of	  their	  own,	  and	  this	  mix	  constitutes	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  for	  the	  activities	  they	  represent.	  Of	  the	  examples	  mentioned,	  the	  ISDA	  has	  the	  most	  developed	  independent	  governance	  mechanisms,	  but	  it	  too	  illustrates	  this	  mix.	  Its	  own	  governance	  mechanisms	  include	  a	  model	  contract	  and	  other	  standardized	  documentation,	  which	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  over-­‐the-­‐counter	  (OTC)	  derivatives	  markets,	  and	  ISDA	  “Determinations	  Committees”	  which	  rule	  on	  whether	  a	  borrower’s	  difficulties	  constitute	  a	  “credit	  event”	  that	  will	  trigger	  payments	  by	  sellers	  of	  credit	  default	  swaps	  to	  buyers	  who	  purchased	  the	  swaps	  to	  avoid	  exposure	  to	  such	  events.	  The	  ISDA	  has	  also	  very	  actively	  sought	  to	  influence	  the	  rulemaking	  of	  public	  authorities,	  mainly	  seeking	  to	  prevent	  new	  regulation	  by	  pointing	  to	  the	  ISDA’s	  own	  governance	  capacities,	  but	  also	  seeking	  to	  alter	  national	  legislation	  to	  ensure	  that	  local	  legal	  systems	  will	  enforce	  contracts	  based	  on	  ISDA	  documentation	  (Biggins	  and	  Scott	  2011).	  This	  pattern	  dates	  back	  to	  the	  explosive	  growth	  in	  international	  derivatives	  in	  the	  1980s,	  and	  continued	  through	  the	  most	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis	  where	  a	  new	  ISDA	  governance	  structure	  for	  market	  practices	  created	  in	  2009	  was	  billed	  as	  supporting	  G20	  objectives.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   In	  contrast,	  the	  IIF	  plays	  a	  more	  modest	  role	  in	  providing	  its	  own	  governance	  mechanisms	  for	  banking,	  but	  aggressively	  engages	  with	  a	  much	  more	  developed	  set	  of	  transnational	  governance	  mechanisms	  controlled	  by	  public	  authorities,	  giving	  this	  TBG	  scheme	  for	  banking	  a	  more	  public	  character.	  The	  IIF’s	  own	  governance	  mechanisms	  include	  the	  sharing	  of	  data	  on	  sovereign	  risks,	  which	  date	  back	  to	  the	  organization’s	  founding	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis	  of	  the	  1980s,	  and	  guidelines	  and	  best	  practices	  which	  were	  issued	  in	  the	  midst	  of	  the	  most	  recent	  global	  financial	  crisis	  (IIF	  2008).	  However	  the	  IIF	  plays	  a	  much	  more	  important	  governance	  role	  in	  its	  interactions	  with	  the	  Basel	  Committee	  on	  Banking	  Supervision	  (BCBS),	  a	  grouping	  of	  representatives	  from	  national	  public	  bank	  regulatory	  authorities.	  The	  BCBS	  has	  developed	  far	  more	  elaborate	  transnational	  rules	  than	  have	  been	  provided	  by	  public	  authorities	  for	  the	  activities	  associated	  with	  the	  other	  examples	  provided	  above.	  The	  BCBS	  has	  very	  closely	  consulted	  with	  the	  IIF	  in	  the	  development	  of	  these	  rules,	  including	  incorporating	  an	  IIF	  proposal	  to	  let	  the	  largest	  banks	  use	  their	  own	  internal	  risk	  models	  when	  calculating	  the	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  levels	  of	  capital	  they	  were	  required	  to	  hold.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  BCBS	  standards	  is	  heavily	  dependent	  on	  their	  implementation	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  private	  banks.	  Critics	  see	  the	  IIF’s	  involvement	  with	  public	  regulators	  as	  an	  instance	  of	  capture,	  since	  it	  gave	  the	  largest	  banks	  a	  competitive	  advantage	  and	  replaced	  public	  rules	  with	  private	  risk	  models	  (Claessens	  and	  Underhill	  2010).	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   Like	  derivatives	  and	  banking,	  the	  other	  major	  types	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activities	  all	  display	  this	  varying	  mix	  of	  public	  and	  private	  governance	  elements	  in	  their	  TBG	  schemes.	  In	  securities	  markets	  public	  authorities	  cooperate	  primarily	  through	  the	  International	  Organization	  of	  Securities	  Commissions,	  which	  has	  produced	  a	  relatively	  weak	  set	  of	  transnational	  standards,	  and	  the	  WFE	  has	  sought	  to	  influence	  these,	  while	  also	  independently	  contributing	  to	  governance	  by	  developing	  principles	  that	  its	  own	  members	  must	  follow	  (McKeen-­‐Edwards,	  2009a).	  	  The	  AIMA,	  whose	  members	  account	  for	  about	  75%	  of	  global	  hedge	  fund	  assets	  (Groome	  2009),	  contributes	  to	  governance	  with	  its	  Chartered	  Alternative	  Investment	  Analyst	  designation	  (CAIA),	  its	  “sound	  practice	  guides”,	  its	  support	  of	  the	  private	  Hedge	  Fund	  Standards	  Board,	  which	  was	  established	  in	  2008	  following	  expressions	  of	  concern	  about	  the	  industry	  from	  the	  G8,	  while	  also	  seeking	  to	  influence	  rulemaking	  by	  public	  authorities.	  Created	  in	  2009,	  the	  GFMA	  has	  three	  members:	  the	  Association	  for	  Financial	  Markets	  in	  Europe	  (AFME),	  the	  Asia	  Securities	  Industry	  &	  Financial	  Markets	  Association	  (ASIFMA),	  and,	  in	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  Securities	  Industry	  and	  Financial	  Markets	  Association	  (SIFMA).	  SIFMA	  and	  the	  GFMA	  shape	  regulation	  through	  lobbying,	  but	  SIFMA	  contributes	  to	  governance	  as	  well	  through	  the	  provision	  of	  standard	  forms	  and	  documentation	  for	  securities	  markets	  transactions.	  	  	   	  	  	   There	  are	  a	  great	  many	  other	  examples	  of	  transnational	  associations	  that	  similarly	  claim	  to	  uniquely	  represent	  other	  distinctive	  types	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activity,	  and	  that	  contribute	  to	  governance	  through	  a	  mix	  of	  their	  own	  rulemaking	  or	  other	  private	  governance	  mechanisms,	  and	  through	  their	  engagement	  with	  the	  rulemaking	  of	  public	  authorities.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  extensively	  enumerate	  these	  in	  the	  present	  article,	  it	  is	  useful	  to	  mention	  two	  additional	  cases	  of	  private	  sector	  contributions	  to	  transnational	  governance,	  which	  combined	  with	  the	  ones	  mentioned	  above	  cover	  all	  the	  major	  categories	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activity.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  insurance	  industry,	  which	  as	  a	  whole	  primarily	  comes	  together	  at	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  International	  Association	  of	  Insurance	  Supervisors	  (IAIS),	  a	  public	  sector	  institution	  to	  which	  private	  firms	  are	  invited.	  The	  IAIS	  plays	  a	  much	  weaker	  role	  in	  governance	  than	  the	  BCBS	  or	  IOSCO	  (McKeen-­‐Edwards	  2009b).	  	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  second	  and	  more	  complicated	  case	  is	  accounting,	  which	  is	  important	  for	  all	  financial	  activities	  and	  therefore	  does	  not	  constitute	  as	  distinctive	  an	  industry	  as	  do	  banking	  and	  the	  other	  activities	  discussed	  so	  far.	  Accounting	  displays	  competition	  between	  the	  US	  Generally	  Accepted	  Accounting	  Principles	  (GAAP),	  which	  are	  significant	  internationally	  because	  of	  the	  number	  of	  foreign	  firms	  that	  use	  US	  markets,	  and	  the	  International	  Accountings	  Standards	  Board	  (IASB),	  which	  produces	  International	  Financial	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  Reporting	  Standards	  (IFRS),	  used	  in	  almost	  120	  countries	  around	  the	  world.	  The	  IASB	  is	  a	  private	  sector	  body	  that	  was	  given	  a	  public	  sector	  oversight	  body,	  the	  International	  Accounting	  Standards	  Committee	  Foundation	  Monitoring	  Board	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  2007/8	  financial	  crisis.	  There	  is	  a	  major	  effort,	  pushed	  by	  the	  G20,	  to	  converge	  the	  two	  sets	  of	  standards	  as	  soon	  as	  possible.	  The	  International	  Federation	  of	  Accountants	  (IFAC)	  also	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  in	  setting	  professional	  standards,	  in	  sponsoring	  the	  International	  Auditing	  and	  Assurance	  Standards	  Board	  (IAASB)	  which	  sets	  auditing	  standards	  and	  three	  other	  boards	  for	  accounting	  ethics,	  education,	  and	  for	  public	  sector	  accounting	  (Loft	  and	  Humphrey	  2009).	  	  	  	   In	  short,	  the	  major	  categories	  of	  activities	  in	  global	  finance	  are	  represented	  by	  associations	  that	  provide	  rules	  of	  their	  own	  and	  work	  closely	  with	  public	  rulemaking	  processes,	  and	  these	  public-­‐private	  arrangements	  constitute	  TBG	  schemes.	  In	  global	  finance	  there	  is	  no	  overarching	  private	  authority	  that	  is	  more	  important	  than	  the	  ones	  discussed.	  It	  is	  possible	  to	  point	  to	  more	  diffuse	  forms	  of	  private	  authority,	  such	  as	  a	  generalized	  belief	  in	  the	  value	  of	  financial	  markets,	  but	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  concrete	  governance	  arrangements,	  all	  the	  most	  significant	  forms	  of	  TBG	  are	  organized	  around	  particular	  types	  of	  financial	  activity,	  facilitated	  by	  recognized	  financial	  associations.	  There	  are	  overlaps	  and	  collaborations	  across	  some	  of	  these	  types	  of	  activities,	  but	  none	  that	  are	  robust	  enough	  to	  have	  resulted	  in	  lasting	  TBG	  schemes.	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  role	  of	  private	  authority	  in	  the	  above	  cases	  varies	  greatly.	  The	  ISDA’s	  independent	  contribution	  to	  governance	  is	  sufficiently	  important	  that	  it	  by	  itself	  could	  almost	  be	  characterized	  as	  a	  fully	  private	  TBG.	  However	  even	  here	  the	  public	  elements	  are	  important,	  and	  thus	  it	  is	  best	  to	  consider	  the	  combined	  elements	  of	  the	  ISDA	  and	  public	  authorities,	  which	  include	  the	  latter’s	  willingness	  to	  not	  implement	  regulation,	  as	  constituting	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  for	  derivatives.	  At	  the	  other	  extreme,	  the	  IAIS	  is	  a	  public	  authority,	  and	  the	  role	  of	  firms	  is	  mostly	  limited	  to	  participation	  in	  the	  meetings	  it	  organizes.	  However,	  as	  previously	  stated,	  TBG	  schemes	  are	  governance	  nodes	  that	  arise	  from	  a	  relatively	  dense	  set	  of	  inter-­‐related	  humans,	  objects,	  and	  practices,	  organized	  around	  certain	  shared	  purposes,	  and	  in	  this	  conception	  the	  IAIS	  is	  an	  important	  node	  in	  the	  transnational	  governance	  of	  insurance,	  and	  its	  connections	  to	  private	  firms	  are	  sufficiently	  important	  in	  it	  playing	  this	  role	  that	  it	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  part	  of	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  for	  insurance.	  While	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  explore	  in	  detail	  here,	  the	  ordering	  capacities	  of	  insurance	  firms,	  including	  reinsurers,	  also	  contribute	  to	  this	  scheme	  (Haufler	  1997;	  McKeen-­‐Edwards	  2009b).	  	  	  
How	  do	  technical	  systems	  interact	  with	  TBG	  schemes?	  	  	   What	  then	  does	  the	  concept	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  add	  to	  our	  understanding	  of	  these	  TBG	  schemes?	  A	  first	  point	  relates	  to	  the	  categories	  of	  activities	  discussed	  above.	  All	  of	  these	  except	  accounting	  have	  a	  node	  of	  governance	  in	  which	  private	  actors	  are	  integrated	  through	  a	  single	  unique	  association.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  activities	  have	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  technical	  system,	  although	  the	  degree	  of	  integration	  and	  materiality	  of	  these	  systems	  varies.	  Earlier	  in	  this	  paper	  the	  two	  indicators	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  were	  (a)	  that	  the	  actors	  involved	  identify	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  common	  enterprise,	  such	  as	  an	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  industry,	  a	  production	  process,	  or	  a	  network,	  that	  has	  a	  purpose;	  and	  (b)	  the	  linkage	  of	  these	  actors	  to	  the	  enterprise’s	  goal	  is	  seen	  as	  constraining	  the	  actors.	  Each	  of	  the	  above	  categories	  is	  defined	  functionally,	  by	  the	  common	  purposes	  of	  the	  activity,	  rather	  than	  by	  some	  other	  characteristic,	  such	  as	  nationality,	  territorial	  proximity,	  a	  shared	  brand,	  or	  the	  personal	  connections	  of	  the	  firms’	  owners.	  A	  single	  firm	  may	  be	  active	  across	  categories:	  its	  participation	  in	  the	  TBG	  schemes	  associated	  with	  those	  categories	  is	  determined	  not	  by	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  firm	  as	  a	  whole,	  but	  rather	  by	  whether	  the	  functional	  activities	  that	  the	  firm	  carries	  out	  match	  with	  the	  categories.	  	  	   	  	  	   Each	  category	  comes	  with	  distinctive	  constraints	  that	  are	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  content	  of	  the	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  governs	  it.	  Banking	  at	  its	  core	  involves	  maturity	  transformation,	  such	  as	  funding	  of	  loans	  or	  other	  assets	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  shorter	  term	  lower	  cost	  funding,	  such	  as	  deposits.	  The	  BCBS	  rules	  primarily	  seek	  to	  regulate	  this	  by	  exposing	  bank	  shareholders	  to	  the	  risks	  of	  these	  activities	  (by	  requiring	  certain	  levels	  of	  capital	  relative	  to	  risk-­‐weighted	  assets),	  thereby	  protecting	  other	  actors	  such	  as	  depositors	  or	  taxpayers.	  Derivatives	  involves	  a	  more	  active	  trading	  of	  risks	  that	  are	  detached	  from	  the	  asset	  that	  they	  reference,	  and	  ISDA	  rules	  primarily	  focus	  on	  the	  contracts	  that	  facilitate	  this.	  Financial	  exchanges,	  such	  as	  the	  New	  York	  Stock	  Exchange,	  primarily	  provide	  architectures	  that	  facilitate	  the	  trading	  of	  stocks	  and	  related	  products,	  and	  which	  require	  centralization	  of	  order	  flow,	  and	  mechanisms	  to	  inspire	  trust.	  The	  WFE	  and	  IOSCO	  therefore	  focus	  on	  rules	  that	  foster	  trust,	  such	  as	  information	  disclosure	  and	  deterrence	  of	  fraud,	  and	  that	  prevent	  the	  financial	  actors	  involved	  in	  this	  centralization	  from	  abusing	  their	  position.	  Much	  securities	  market	  activity	  involves	  more	  direct	  trading	  among	  firms	  and	  this	  larger	  and	  less	  regulated	  category	  of	  activity	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  GFMA	  and	  SIFMA.	  Insurance	  involves	  the	  pooling	  of	  risks,	  and	  the	  IAIS	  focuses	  on	  the	  distinctive	  problems	  associated	  with	  this,	  such	  as	  the	  accumulation	  of	  risks	  from	  insurance	  firms	  by	  reinsurers	  located	  in	  lightly	  regulated	  jurisdictions.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  What	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  coherence	  that	  these	  categories	  display?	  Why	  do	  activities	  consistently	  fall	  into	  these	  categories	  despite	  the	  enormous	  creativity	  and	  pace	  of	  change	  in	  global	  finance?	  In	  part	  the	  answer	  can	  be	  found	  at	  the	  level	  of	  shared	  ideas,	  where	  the	  existence	  of	  recognized	  practices	  such	  as	  banking	  or	  derivatives	  trading	  and	  the	  characteristics	  associated	  with	  them	  facilitate	  transactions	  that	  otherwise	  would	  be	  too	  amorphous	  or	  confusing	  to	  carry	  out	  at	  any	  significant	  scale.	  However	  there	  are	  material	  dimensions	  to	  this	  interdependence	  as	  well.	  The	  standardized	  contracts	  provided	  by	  the	  ISDA	  are	  not	  just	  carried	  around	  in	  traders’	  memories:	  they	  are	  inscribed	  on	  paper	  or	  in	  electronic	  systems,	  and	  thereby	  made	  more	  durable.	  Each	  of	  the	  categories	  of	  financial	  activities	  discussed	  above	  comes	  with	  such	  material	  artefacts,	  including	  the	  electronic	  linkages	  between	  banks,	  the	  physical	  or	  electronic	  architectures	  of	  exchanges,	  archives	  of	  data	  on	  the	  pricing	  and	  volume	  of	  securities	  trading,	  or	  binders	  of	  policies	  and	  procedures.	  To	  participate	  in	  the	  activities	  associated	  with	  one	  or	  another	  activity	  a	  financial	  actor	  must	  make	  use	  of	  and	  conform	  to	  these	  ideas	  and	  material	  artefacts.	  Taken	  together	  these	  shared	  ideas	  and	  material	  artefacts	  are	  like	  tools	  designed	  to	  carry	  out	  particular	  tasks	  that	  don’t	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  work	  well	  for	  other	  tasks.	  These	  constraints,	  and	  the	  functional	  purposes	  to	  which	  they	  are	  related,	  are	  the	  defining	  properties	  of	  a	  technical	  system.	  	  
Explaining	  variation	  in	  the	  mix	  of	  public	  and	  private	  elements	  across	  TBG	  schemes	  
	   Can	  an	  emphasis	  on	  technical	  systems	  help	  explain	  the	  variation	  across	  TBG	  schemes	  that	  the	  cases	  discussed	  above	  reveal?	  The	  above	  discussion	  showed	  how	  the	  major	  categories	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activity	  have	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  loosely	  integrated	  technical	  system,	  with	  one	  public/private	  TBG	  scheme	  that	  seeks	  to	  govern	  each	  category	  as	  a	  whole.	  But	  why	  are	  public	  sector	  rules	  more	  prominent	  in	  banking	  and	  private	  sector	  rules	  in	  derivatives	  markets?	  Why	  are	  financial	  exchanges	  organized	  into	  an	  association	  that	  interacts	  with	  the	  public	  regulators	  while	  insurance	  firms	  are	  not?	  The	  distinctive	  properties	  of	  different	  technical	  systems	  help	  answer	  these	  questions.	  The	  maturity	  transformation	  function	  at	  the	  core	  of	  banking	  creates	  an	  inherent	  risk	  of	  collapse	  since	  banks	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  liquidate	  their	  longer	  term	  assets	  if	  depositors	  or	  other	  short	  term	  sources	  of	  funding	  start	  to	  lose	  confidence	  in	  the	  bank.	  Since	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  this	  maturity	  transformation	  are	  managed	  internally	  by	  the	  bank,	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  banks	  to	  inspire	  confidence	  if	  doubts	  arise.	  Moreover	  banks	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  payments	  system,	  exchanging	  payments	  with	  one	  another	  and	  customers,	  and	  thereby	  increasing	  the	  risk	  of	  contagion	  as	  problems	  at	  one	  bank	  spread	  to	  others	  and	  threaten	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  Accordingly	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  public	  authorities	  typically	  have	  been	  strongly	  concerned	  with	  bank	  regulation	  and	  support	  of	  banks	  during	  crises,	  including	  at	  the	  transnational	  level.	  	  	   	  	  	   In	  contrast,	  the	  trading	  of	  securities	  and	  derivatives	  more	  often	  involves	  risks	  that	  are	  restricted	  to	  those	  who	  own	  or	  trade	  them,	  and	  rules	  managed	  by	  financial	  actors	  themselves	  have	  traditionally	  been	  seen	  as	  more	  appropriate	  than	  in	  the	  banking	  case.	  Such	  rules	  are	  needed	  because	  of	  the	  highly	  integrated	  character	  of	  market	  exchanges,	  which	  involve	  the	  bringing	  together	  of	  multiple	  competing	  buyers	  and	  sellers,	  often	  from	  outside	  the	  industry	  itself.	  Insurance	  involves	  even	  less	  systemic	  risk	  and	  interdependence,	  and	  therefore	  less	  need	  for	  formal	  rulemaking:	  premiums	  are	  typically	  paid	  in	  for	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time	  before	  a	  claim	  for	  a	  loss	  arises,	  and	  unlike	  bank	  deposits	  those	  premiums	  cannot	  be	  suddenly	  withdrawn	  if	  doubts	  arise	  about	  a	  firm’s	  solvency.	  The	  insurance	  firms	  themselves	  share	  risks	  through	  reinsurers,	  but	  the	  management	  of	  these	  risks	  can	  more	  easily	  rely	  on	  rules	  provided	  by	  reinsurers	  in	  private	  contracts	  than	  is	  the	  case	  for	  financial	  exchanges,	  where	  the	  relevant	  parties	  to	  transactions	  are	  more	  variable	  and	  external	  to	  the	  industry.	  	  
Explaining	  variation	  in	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  among	  TBGs	  
	  	   In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  article	  I	  hypothesized	  that	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  of	  technical	  systems	  would	  result	  in	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  arising	  for	  each	  technical	  system,	  with	  two	  exceptions:	  where	  previously	  separated	  technical	  systems	  begin	  to	  overlap	  or	  where	  the	  technical	  system	  is	  weak	  enough	  that	  the	  advantages	  of	  competition	  outweigh	  the	  advantages	  of	  having	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme.	  In	  order	  to	  assess	  this	  hypothesis	  it	  is	  helpful	  to	  expand	  the	  number	  of	  cases	  beyond	  the	  ones	  discussed	  so	  far,	  to	  introduce	  more	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  variation	  than	  is	  present	  in	  the	  large	  well	  established	  categories	  of	  activity	  such	  as	  banking,	  securities,	  derivatives	  or	  insurance	  that	  were	  discussed	  above.	  It	  is	  useful	  to	  start	  with	  accounting	  because	  of	  its	  importance	  in	  global	  finance	  and	  because	  of	  the	  competition	  between	  the	  US	  GAAP	  and	  the	  IASB	  which	  was	  noted	  above.	  However	  it	  is	  also	  useful	  to	  consider	  other	  examples	  of	  competition.	  I	  focus	  on	  TBGs	  with	  two	  very	  different	  types	  of	  technical	  systems.	  The	  first	  are	  centralized	  securities	  depositories	  (CSDs)	  which	  involve	  more	  tightly	  integrated	  technical	  systems	  dependent	  on	  shared	  material	  infrastructures,	  and	  the	  second	  are	  professional	  designations	  in	  risk	  management,	  for	  which	  the	  technical	  system	  is	  very	  weak.	  Both	  display	  competition,	  but	  in	  the	  former	  case	  there	  are	  strong	  tendencies	  to	  integrate	  competing	  TBG	  schemes,	  as	  is	  the	  case	  with	  accounting.	  These	  cases	  help	  explore	  the	  hypothesized	  relations	  between	  a	  technical	  system	  and	  competition	  between	  TBG	  schemes	  that	  were	  discussed	  above.	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   In	  the	  case	  of	  accounting,	  the	  split	  between	  US	  GAAP	  and	  the	  IASB’s	  standards	  and	  the	  effort	  to	  harmonize	  them	  represent	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  US-­‐based	  technical	  system	  to	  one	  that	  is	  more	  compatible	  with	  multiple	  other	  jurisdictions.	  Accounting	  is	  a	  relatively	  integrated	  technical	  system	  since	  its	  purpose	  is	  to	  allow	  investors	  to	  make	  rigorous	  standardized	  comparisons	  of	  the	  financial	  health	  of	  the	  firms	  in	  which	  they	  are	  investing.	  If	  standards	  are	  not	  sufficiently	  harmonized	  or	  specific	  this	  comparison	  cannot	  happen.	  US	  accounting	  has	  been	  oriented	  towards	  highly	  competitive	  capital	  markets	  from	  the	  start,	  while	  accounting	  elsewhere	  was	  more	  oriented	  towards	  taxation	  or	  less	  market	  oriented	  forms	  of	  financing.	  As	  the	  European	  Union	  became	  more	  integrated	  and	  powerful	  it	  was	  able	  to	  sponsor	  competing	  standards	  to	  US	  GAAP	  (Posner	  2009)	  .	  However	  the	  push	  to	  harmonize	  US	  GAAP	  and	  the	  IASB	  standards	  indicates	  that	  the	  advantages	  of	  having	  a	  single	  global	  TBG	  scheme	  in	  accounting	  standards	  outweighs	  the	  political	  advantages	  to	  the	  US	  or	  the	  EU	  of	  having	  their	  own	  distinct	  schemes.	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	   A	  similar	  example	  of	  overlapping	  technical	  systems	  is	  provided	  by	  central	  securities	  depositories.	  CSDs	  have	  been	  very	  important	  in	  financial	  markets	  because	  they	  allow	  widespread	  securities	  trading	  to	  occur	  while	  the	  actual	  securities	  remain	  in	  a	  single	  location,	  avoiding	  continual	  costly	  and	  risky	  physical	  transfer.	  Once	  a	  trade	  is	  agreed,	  it	  is	  settled	  by	  recording	  the	  change	  of	  ownership	  at	  the	  CSD.	  CSDs	  contribute	  to	  governance	  in	  carrying	  out	  this	  organizational	  function,	  in	  safeguarding	  securities,	  and	  in	  establishing	  certain	  rules	  for	  CSD	  clients.	  In	  the	  US	  there	  are	  two	  CSDs,	  Fedwire	  Securities	  Service	  run	  by	  the	  public	  Federal	  Reserve	  banks,	  which	  handles	  securities	  issued	  by	  public	  authorities,	  and	  DTC	  which	  handles	  all	  other	  securities.	  DTC	  grew	  out	  of	  a	  fragmented	  US	  CSD	  landscape	  and	  now	  enjoys	  an	  effective	  monopoly	  (European	  Commission	  2012:	  68).	  In	  Europe	  there	  are	  two	  international	  CSDs:	  Euroclear	  and	  Clearstream.	  Euroclear	  has	  a	  closer	  connection	  with	  Belgian,	  French	  and	  Dutch	  markets,	  while	  Clearstream	  has	  a	  closer	  connection	  with	  German	  ones.	  Clearstream	  has	  a	  dominant	  market	  position,	  and	  has	  been	  convicted	  of	  abusing	  this	  dominance.	  As	  well	  there	  are	  dozens	  of	  national	  CSDs	  in	  Europe.	  	  	  	  	   As	  cross-­‐border	  trading	  has	  grown	  there	  have	  been	  multiple	  efforts	  to	  integrate	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  CSDs,	  complicated	  by	  political	  concerns,	  such	  as	  European	  worries	  about	  US	  dominance	  or	  national	  worries	  about	  threats	  to	  local	  CSDs.	  The	  European	  Central	  Securities	  Depositories	  Association	  (ECSDA),	  created	  in	  1997,	  has	  developed	  standards	  and	  made	  other	  efforts	  to	  remove	  obstacles	  to	  cross-­‐border	  settlement.	  Euroclear	  and	  Clearstream	  have	  established	  an	  “electronic	  bridge”	  to	  facilitate	  trading	  across	  both	  CSDs.	  The	  International	  Securities	  Market	  Advisory	  Group	  was	  established	  in	  2007	  to	  bring	  together	  various	  stakeholders	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  increasing	  standardization	  and	  efficiency	  in	  the	  operations	  of	  Euroclear	  and	  Clearstream	  (2011).	  With	  European	  Commission	  encouragement,	  key	  European	  securities	  market	  actors	  agreed	  to	  a	  voluntary	  code	  of	  conduct	  for	  market	  infrastructures	  in	  2006,	  designed	  to	  promote	  interoperability.	  Euroclear	  and	  Clearstream	  have	  each	  developed	  close	  linkages	  with	  different	  sets	  of	  national	  CSDs,	  using	  mergers,	  joint	  ventures,	  or	  other	  mechanisms	  (European	  Commission	  2012:	  52).	  The	  ECB	  is	  presently	  sponsoring	  a	  “TARGET2-­‐Securities”	  (T2S)	  initiative	  with	  a	  2015	  deadline,	  which	  will	  be	  a	  technical	  platform	  to	  facilitate	  coordination	  among	  CSDs.	  Facilitating	  the	  reduction	  of	  barriers	  among	  CSDs	  has	  become	  a	  priority	  for	  the	  European	  Union.	  Overall	  the	  experience	  of	  CSDs	  in	  Europe	  illustrates	  how	  highly	  integrated	  technical	  systems	  that	  were	  once	  separated	  from	  one	  another	  geographically	  can	  start	  to	  overlap	  as	  cross-­‐border	  interactions	  become	  more	  common,	  and	  then	  to	  begin	  to	  integrate	  with	  one	  another.	  This	  process	  can	  bring	  about	  the	  integration	  of	  previously	  distinct	  TBG	  schemes.	  	  	   	  	  	   In	  general	  professional	  designations	  involve	  much	  more	  weakly	  integrated	  technical	  systems.	  Individuals	  with	  the	  designation	  are	  interdependent	  with	  regard	  to	  their	  reputations	  and	  technical	  knowledge,	  but	  do	  not	  have	  to	  interact	  directly	  with	  one	  another	  through	  a	  single	  physical	  architecture,	  nor	  are	  third	  parties	  as	  dependent	  on	  harmonized	  professional	  designations	  as	  they	  are	  with	  accounting	  standards.	  Thus	  it	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  there	  is	  more	  competition	  among	  TBG	  schemes	  for	  designations	  than	  is	  the	  case	  for	  CSDs.	  For	  instance	  both	  the	  Global	  Association	  of	  Risk	  Professionals	  and	  the	  Professional	  Risk	  Managers’	  International	  Association	  provide	  codes	  of	  conduct	  and	  professional	  designations,	  and	  there	  are	  two	  other	  organizations,	  the	  International	  Federation	  of	  Risk	  and	  Insurance	  Management	  Associations	  and	  the	  Risk	  Management	  Association	  which	  provide	  some	  overlapping	  information	  sharing	  functions,	  although	  without	  providing	  designations.	  	  	  
Alternative	  approaches	  	  	  	   It	  is	  useful	  to	  contrast	  this	  emphasis	  on	  technical	  systems	  to	  alternative	  ways	  of	  analyzing	  TBG	  schemes.	  Most	  existing	  analysis	  of	  governance	  in	  global	  finance	  focuses	  on	  the	  role	  of	  public	  authorities	  (Helleiner	  and	  Pagliari	  2011).	  There	  are	  important	  differences	  between	  approaches	  that	  emphasize	  the	  interests	  of	  domestic	  regulators	  (Singer	  2007),	  the	  power	  of	  the	  US	  state	  (Panitch	  and	  Konings	  2008;	  Simmons	  2001),	  the	  power	  and	  competitive	  interactions	  of	  many	  states	  (Drezner	  2007,	  Helleiner	  1994),	  or	  the	  ongoing	  interactions	  of	  regulators	  in	  transnational	  policy	  networks	  (Porter	  2011;	  Slaughter	  2004;	  Tsingou	  2009).	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  the	  last	  of	  these,	  which	  acknowledges	  the	  influence	  of	  private	  actors	  in	  transnational	  networks,	  the	  tendency	  is	  to	  treat	  private	  financial	  activities	  as	  an	  external	  object	  of	  governance.	  Even	  those	  who	  emphasize	  transnational	  policy	  
	   




 	   This	  article	  has	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  important	  to	  consider	  the	  role	  played	  by	  technical	  systems	  when	  analyzing	  the	  complex	  variety	  and	  interactions	  of	  TBG	  schemes	  that	  are	  becoming	  increasingly	  prominent	  in	  global	  governance.	  It	  defined	  a	  technical	  system	  as	  involving	  a	  set	  of	  relationships	  among	  humans	  and	  non-­‐human	  objects	  that	  are	  shaped	  and	  constrained	  by	  the	  operations	  that	  are	  seen	  as	  required	  to	  successfully	  achieve	  a	  purpose	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  or	  output	  that	  is	  associated	  with	  that	  system,	  and	  pointed	  to	  the	  frequent	  overlap	  or	  correspondence	  between	  a	  technical	  system	  and	  an	  industry.	  It	  specified	  two	  indicators	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  technical	  system:	  that	  the	  actors	  involved	  identify	  themselves	  as	  part	  of	  a	  common	  enterprise,	  such	  as	  an	  industry,	  a	  production	  process,	  or	  a	  network,	  that	  has	  a	  purpose;	  and	  that	  the	  linkage	  of	  these	  actors	  to	  the	  enterprise’s	  goal	  is	  seen	  as	  constraining	  the	  actors.	  It	  noted	  that	  the	  degree	  of	  integration	  of	  technical	  systems	  can	  vary,	  with	  some	  continually	  linking	  actors	  closely	  together	  in	  a	  shared	  physical	  infrastructure,	  with	  others	  involving	  a	  more	  minimal	  set	  of	  shared	  practices.	  	   	  	  	   The	  article	  argued	  that	  in	  most	  cases	  the	  properties	  of	  a	  technical	  system	  lead	  to	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  addressing	  issues	  relevant	  to	  the	  system	  as	  a	  whole.	  The	  major	  categories	  of	  transnational	  financial	  activity,	  with	  the	  exception	  of	  accounting,	  follow	  this	  pattern.	  In	  each	  case	  the	  private	  authority	  elements	  of	  TBG	  schemes	  were	  facilitated	  by	  associations.	  These	  associations	  provided	  governance	  functions	  themselves	  while	  also	  seeking	  to	  influence	  governance	  functions	  provided	  by	  public	  authorities.	  While	  the	  advantages	  of	  having	  a	  single	  point	  of	  interaction	  between	  public	  authorities	  and	  an	  industry	  certainly	  contributed	  to	  this	  pattern,	  the	  correlation	  of	  each	  of	  these	  single	  nodes	  with	  a	  technical	  system	  of	  which	  it	  is	  part	  indicated	  the	  importance	  of	  that	  technical	  system	  in	  explaining	  the	  pattern.	  Moreover	  variations	  in	  the	  properties	  of	  the	  technical	  system	  help	  explain	  variations	  in	  the	  character	  of	  the	  TBGs	  that	  are	  associated	  with	  them,	  as	  with	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  prominence	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  ISDA	  in	  the	  case	  of	  derivatives,	  and	  the	  public	  sector	  IAIS	  in	  insurance.	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  article	  also	  hypothesized	  that	  competition	  among	  TBG	  schemes	  would	  occur	  where	  technical	  systems	  begin	  to	  overlap	  or	  where	  the	  technical	  system	  is	  so	  weak	  that	  the	  advantages	  of	  competition	  outweigh	  the	  advantages	  of	  centralized	  coordination.	  Examples	  were	  provided	  of	  the	  competition	  between	  technical	  systems	  and	  TBGs	  that	  is	  created	  when	  technical	  systems	  that	  were	  previously	  separated	  by	  geography	  begin	  to	  overlap,	  including	  the	  competition	  between	  US	  GAAP	  and	  the	  IASB	  standards,	  and	  competition	  among	  the	  European	  CSDs.	  However	  each	  of	  these	  also	  displayed	  efforts	  to	  integrate	  the	  competing	  technical	  systems	  and	  TBGs—shifting	  towards	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  a	  single	  TBG	  scheme	  presiding	  over	  the	  newly	  integrated	  technical	  system.	  Elements	  of	  challenges	  to	  dominant	  actors	  in	  these	  processes	  were	  evident	  in	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  EU	  or	  other	  foreign	  actors	  to	  rely	  on	  US	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  the	  case	  of	  accounting	  and	  the	  CSDs.	  The	  competition	  among	  TBG	  schemes	  where	  technical	  systems	  are	  weak	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  case	  of	  professional	  risk	  management	  designations.	  	  	   	  	  	   These	  patterns	  that	  are	  revealed	  by	  bringing	  technical	  systems	  into	  analysis	  of	  TBG	  schemes	  would	  be	  obscured	  by	  alternative	  approaches	  that	  focus	  on	  the	  competitive	  interactions	  of	  TBG	  schemes,	  or	  that	  see	  TBG	  schemes	  as	  shaped	  by	  public	  authorities.	  Both	  of	  these	  alternatives	  neglect	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  private	  and	  public	  elements	  of	  TBG	  schemes	  arise	  from	  and	  interact	  with	  the	  organized	  technical	  properties	  of	  the	  industry	  activities	  that	  they	  seek	  to	  govern.	  	  	   	  	  	   The	  richly	  detailed	  empirical	  information	  that	  can	  be	  integrated	  with	  theoretical	  analysis	  when	  TBG	  schemes	  are	  considered	  in	  relationship	  to	  technical	  systems	  is	  very	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  helpful	  for	  enhancing	  our	  understanding	  of	  TBG	  schemes,	  but	  also	  makes	  the	  establishment	  of	  comprehensive	  and	  conclusive	  theoretical	  claims	  more	  challenging.	  There	  is	  much	  more	  that	  could	  be	  said	  about	  the	  technical	  systems	  that	  were	  analyzed	  above,	  and	  the	  great	  many	  that	  were	  not.	  The	  article	  compared	  the	  most	  important	  categories	  of	  financial	  activity	  and	  also	  provided	  examples	  of	  more	  specific	  sets	  of	  activities	  with	  technical	  systems	  that	  varied	  in	  their	  degree	  of	  integration.	  While	  these	  confirmed	  the	  hypotheses,	  it	  would	  be	  important	  to	  extend	  the	  analysis	  to	  other	  cases,	  and	  to	  explore	  the	  complex	  interactions	  between	  organized	  technical	  subsystems,	  such	  as	  CSDs,	  and	  larger	  technical	  systems	  in	  which	  they	  operate,	  like	  the	  securities	  industry.	  As	  well,	  there	  is	  interesting	  work	  to	  be	  done	  to	  compare	  the	  relationships	  between	  technical	  systems	  and	  TBG	  schemes	  in	  finance	  with	  other	  issue	  areas.	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